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THE FALSETTI, WAX AND BAILER LABOR CASES:
EXHAUSTION OF INTERNAL REMEDIES AND
NLRB EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
When a labor union member is wrongfully expelled from the union, to
what tribunal does he appeal for aid? When he is discharged from his employment and applies to his union for help in being reinstated to his former
job and the union fails to help or expels him, to whom does the union member
appeal in order to procure a remedy? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
handed down a trio of decisions' which clarify Pennsylvania's law concerning
these questions.
There are two determinations to be made before a Pennsylvania court will
assume jurisdiction over such a matter.2 The first is whether a member must
exhaust his internal remedies within the union and, if so, whether he in fact
exhausted them. The second issue is whether, through the Labor Management
Relations Act 3 (more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act), Congress
intended federal pre-emption to be invoked by the National Labor Relations
Board. Each of these issues will be treated separately in this Note.
The exhaustion of internal remedies rule, as it applies to labor unions and
4
their members, was clearly pronounced in Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW.
In that case, a union member was laid off from his job on the ground that
he was no longer able to fulfill his job requirements. Members of lesser
seniority were retained and hired by the employer company subsequent to
the plaintiff's dismissal. Plaintiff was then expelled from the union and subsequently commenced an action in equity, seeking the restoration of his union
membership and reinstatement to his former position of employment. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the exhaustion of internal remedies
doctrine and held that where a member has a complaint against a union, he
must first exhaust his internal remedies within the union as provided for in
its constitution and bylaws. The rule is similar to the exhaustion of remedies
rule that is applied in the field of administrative law.
1. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960) ; Wax v. International Mailers Union, 400 Pa. 173, 161 A.2d 603 (1960) ; Bailer v. Local 470, International Teamsters, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343 (1960).
2. There are other jurisdictional questions, such as jurisdiction over the person,
which, not being unique to this type of case, are not considered here.

3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
4. Supra note 1.
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Originally, the reason supporting the exhaustion rule in dealing with
labor unions was explained on a contract theory. The member formed a
contractual relationship with the union when he joined, i.e., the member
contracted to follow all the procedures set forth in the union's constitution
and bylaws. 5 The general criticism of the contract theory is that, if followed
strictly, the exhaustion rule might be applied mechanically in instances where
such application would lead to injustice. This would necessitate the formulation of exceptions which would tend to render the rule ineffective. 6
Consequently, the courts today look toward the broader public policies
which support the existence of the rule. As the court in Falsetti noted, there
are several sets of interests to be considered in intra-association disputes:
"(1) the interest of the association as such; (2) the interest of the members
of the association; and (3) the interest of the courts."' 7 Besides these, the
court continued, there is "an over-riding public interest in promoting wellmanaged autonomous associations which are able to perform their functions
effectively and still provide internally for the fair treatment of individual
members who must be disciplined."

'8

Even when grounded on public policy, however, the exhaustion rule is
not without its exceptions. There are, generally speaking, four exceptions
which deny application of the rule. They are:
First and foremost, a person will not be required to take intraassociation appeals which cannot in fact yield remedies. If the remedy
exists in theory only, it can well be considered illusory. Secondly,
there is no need for a member to exhaust his internal remedies
where the association officials have, by their own actions, precluded
the member from having a fair or effective trial or appeal ...
Still another exception to the rule is where to insist that a
member exhaust the appellate procedure would be unduly burdensome, e.g., if the appellate procedure requires a member to appeal to
a national convention which does not convene for several years....
And finally, there are instances where the requirement of exhaustion of remedies would subject a member to an injury that is
in a practical sense irreparable. Such a situation would arise where a
person expelled from a union and suing for readmittance would,
during the interim of his appeal, be barred from working in a union
shop. 9
5. See Binkowski v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 254, 256
(C.P. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 389 Pa. 116, 132 A.2d 281 (1957) : "The failure to exhaust
remedies provided by the association's rules and regulations is a breach of contractual
obligation in itself." See also O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 348
Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944) ; Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra note 1.
6. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra note 1.
7. Id. at 157, 161 A.2d at 888.
8. Id. at 157-58, 161 A.2d at 888.
9. Id. at 159-60, 161 A.2d at 889-90.
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Where any of these situations arises, the member may bypass the union's
remedial procedures and take his case directly to court. However, these
exceptions are strictly construed and applied.' 0
In order to fall within the jurisdiction of the court, a plaintiff must
plead affirmatively either that he has exhausted all his internal remedies or
that to do so would be futile or prejudicial to his cause, i.e., he must plead one
of the exceptions. 11 These pleadings cannot be general averments, but must
be specific, either stating how all the remedies have been exhausted or why
one of the exceptions should apply.' 2 This is a jurisdictional requirement,
and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
What may the court review once its jurisdiction is established? In
Maloney v. UMW,1 3 it was stated that a decision of a union may not be
attacked collaterally. The court may look to see whether the union followed its
bylaws and constitution and gave its members a fair trial, and that it had
jurisdiction over the dispute in question. The court will not, however, review
the merits of the case. 14 It may determine only whether the member received
all the rights for which he contracted.
Does the exhaustion of internal remedies rule, as it applies to unions,
afford the justice that our legal system seeks? Today, labor unions are
mammoth organizations. They were created to serve a public need, that is,
to protect the individually powerless laborers from the immense enterprises
employing them. Today, however, the laborer may need protection from the
unions as well. The exhaustion rule has added to the autonomy of unions.
The member who has been wronged must look to the officials of the very union
that committed the wrong in order to obtain relief. This situation seems paradoxical in light of the sought-after end. It would seem that one aggrieved by
an institution of such social and political importance should be able to bring
his complaint into a court of law. The wronged member has been injured by
10. Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, supra note 1.
11. Ibid.
12. Durso v. Philadelphia Musical Soc'y, Local 77, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 463, 469 (C.P.
1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 30, 139 A.2d 555 (1958): "A mere averment that a remedy is
futile or illusory can not result in plaintiff lifting himself up by his own boot straps."
13. 308 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225 (1932).
14. [T]he courts may judge whether the exercise is arbitrary, and review the
form of proceedings to see whether the tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction
and in the line of order, but cannot review the case on its merits. Courts entertain jurisdiction to keep these tribunals within their own laws, and to correct
abuses, so as to preserve, on the one hand, the rights of the association, and, on
the other, those of the members, but they do not inquire into the merits in a
regular course of proceeding.
Maloney v. UMW, supra note 13, at 257, 162 AtI. at 226-27. "It is only when the constitution and bylaws themselves are so defective as to deny due process or when the
procedure permits those who impose the punishment to sit in review as well that the
court will intervene." Durso v. Philadelphia Musical Soc'y, Local 77, supra note 12, at

470.
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the union and the legislature has not taken away the power of the courts to
give redress;15 why then should a private association be able to deprive the
court of jurisdiction?
There are, however, arguments to the contrary. The requirement for
exhaustion of remedies within the union does serve a social and judicial
function. For example, the injured member may be able to satisfy his
complaint without recourse to the courts, which are overflowing with litigation. If a fair remedy is obtainable without resort to the courts, why then
should the burden on the courts not be alleviated. Another advantage of
requiring a member to exhaust his remedies within the union is that the
union is often better able to deal with the individual case. 16 "It makes
possible the settlement of such matters by a simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedure, and by persons who, generally, are intimately acquainted
therewith.' 7 Perhaps a few of the individual's benefits should be sacrificed for
the good of all. The union must judge and rule in a manner which furthers
the policies which favor its general membership rather than those which
benefit that of a single individual only. It also has responsibilities to society,
the fulfillment of which is the underlying purpose of the union's existence.
Social pressures dictate that the union act fairly and justly, and if it should
not, the courts are vested with jurisdiction to review its procedures and
attitudes.1 8 The union is not imbued with the right to promulgate its own substantive laws, but rather, it acts as a fact-finding body which applies existing
law to its factual findings in the manner of courts of law. However, because of
its expertise, the union is considered competent to interpret the facts and the
law.' 9 So, in theory, one who pursues his remedies within the union's judicial
machinery should be assured of receiving just results.
In many cases where a member of a union has a dispute with the
union or with his employer, the National Labor Relations Board will have
primary exclusive jurisdiction 2° over the matter. The jurisdiction of the
NLRB pre-empts what formerly had been the jurisdiction of the state and fed15.

The exhaustion of remedies rule is one that has been established by the courts.

Strano V. Local 690, 398 Pa. 97, 156 A.2d 522 (1959).
16. Binkowski v. Highway Truck Drivers, Local 107, supra note 5.
17. Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 564, 277 P.2d 464, 468 (1954).
See also Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARM. L. REV. 601, 648 (1956).
18. See text accompanying and authorities cited note 14 supra.
19. "Intra-association disputes involve specialized problems best left to the disposition of expert tribunals, i.e., the intra-union judicial machinery, more familiar with
Binkowski v. Highway Truck
underlying causes and ramifications of the disputes .
Drivers, Local 107, supra note 5, at 256.
20. "Primary exclusive" jurisdiction, or sometimes merely called "exclusive" jurisdiction, means that the matter before the court must be first heard and decided by the
appropriate administrative agency before a court will assume jurisdiction. It is only
such administrative agency which has original jurisdicton over that subject matter. See
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.01 (1958).
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eral courts in many aspects of labor relations. The problem that arises, jurisdictionally speaking, is whether the aggrieved employee union member must
bring his action before the NLRB or in the courts. The answer to this
21
problem lies in the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Section 722 of the act sets forth the privileges to which both members of the
unions and the unions themselves are entitled, and any vitiation of these
rights results in a violation of the act. Section 823 of the act enumerates
"unfair labor practices." Section 1024 grants jurisdiction to the NLRB whenever any of the aforementioned sections has been violated. Thus, both the
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have
established the rule that "if the activity complained of is arguably subject
to Section 7 or 8, then exclusive jurisdiction is in the NLRB and the
grievances are not subject to litigation in the tribunals of the state or the
federal courts ... .
The jurisdictional distinctions which arise as a result of the vesting of
exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB in certain instances have given rise to
difficult problems in the practical administration of the rule. The Pennsylvania
20
Supreme Court faced these problems in Wax v. InternationalMailers Union
2
and Bailer v. Local 470, International Teamsters."
In the Wax case, the plaintiff was a mailer who belonged to the defendant
union. He was expelled from the union, claimed that his dismissal was unjust, and, as a result, lost his employment and was unable to obtain other
employment. Plaintiff brought a suit in equity against the union, asking for
reinstatement to membership and damages. After deciding that the plaintiff
had not exhausted his available remedies within the framework of the union,
and, therefore, that the court did not have jurisdiction, the court considered
the question whether it or the NLRB would have jurisdiction if there had
been exhaustion of internal remedies. The court felt that the plaintiff's reason
for bringing the action was that he had lost his employment due to his expulsion from the union and that he was unable to find new employment of
the same kind without being a member of the said union. Thus, the gravamen
of his complaint was injury to his employment relationship rather than to
his union-member relationship. 28 Because of this, the conduct was arguably in
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).

23. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
25. Baker v. Shopmen's Local 755, 403 Pa. 31, 36, 168 A.2d 340, 342 (1961).
(Emphasis added.) San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
see also Wax v. International Mailers Union, supra note 1.
26. Supra note 1.

27. Ibid.

28. Wax, in his complaint, did not allege unfair labor practices on the part of the
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violation of Section 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act and consequently the NLRB, and not the court, had jurisdiction over the
controversy.
In the Bailer case, the plaintiff was fired after he had circulated during
working hours a petition demanding democratic procedures within the union's
political framework. The circulation of the petition was precipitated by the
union's refusal to honor the plaintiff's motion, made at a union meeting, that
the union local not vote for James Hoffa for their president, and the plaintiff's
being told that the local would vote for Hoffa regardless of what the members
desired. After his dismissal, plaintiff asked the union to protect his rights, but
the union did nothing. He had been unable to find subsequent employment
through the union while members of lesser seniority had been successful.
The court held that, as to the union's alleged breach of its fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff, 29 the state court had jurisdiction, but as to the alleged dis-

crimination by the defendant union against plaintiff, the NLRB had
jurisdiction.
Thus evolves an important distinction upon which the courts rely to
determine the jurisdictional question. "The state court proceedings deal
with arbitrariness and misconduct vis-A-vis the individual union members
and the union; the Board proceeding, looking principally to the nexus between
union action and employee discrimination, examines the ouster from membership in entirely different terms." 30 As with so many distinctions, this one
becomes quite hazy in many cases. When is the member claiming injury to
his union relationship and when to his employment relationship? Whatever
conclusion is reached, it appears that the courts found their decisions upon a
technical analysis and interpretation of the pleadings of both parties. Although
the plaintiff may allege only the breach of a duty by the union, the court may
read between the lines and conclude that the alleged injury is based upon
employment discrimination by the union, 31 thus requiring the NLRB to assume
jurisdiction.
This distinction, however, seems to be almost a fiction, for in most cases
union, but the court interpreted the complaint as being based solely upon injury to Wax's
employment relationship.
29. This alleged breach of duty by the union was their refusal to take any action
to aid the plaintiff in regaining his former employment.
30. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1958).
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the court had jurisdiction, for the complaint
alleged injury to the union-member relationship, and that the injury to the employment
relationship was merely incidental thereto. Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent, felt
that this distinction was somewhat illusory and that it would cause a duplication of
remedies that would harm the national labor policies.
31. In so concluding, the court looks to the pleadings of both parties and the
alleged facts. Where injury to employment seems to be the foundation of the complaint,
the court will award the jurisdiction to the NLRB.
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when a member who has lost his employment sues his union, his motive in
instigating the action is the injury to his employment. 32 That is the benefit
for which he joined the union in the first instance. It is difficult to envision a
situation where employment and employment opportunities would not be
injured as a result of the member's dismissal from the union. Consequently,
when there is any question as to what relationship has been injured-the employment or the union relationship-the courts will usually resolve the
question in favor of the former.
The policy behind favoring NLRB jurisdiction can be traced to congressional intent. The NLRB was established so that national labor policies would
be unified 3 3 and the courts recognize that a duplication of forums in which labor disputes might be tried can deeply undermine the national policies that have
been created.3 4 To allow each individual court to award its own remedies
would tend to cause confusion and disrupt the smooth flow of such policy. Thus
it seems that where there may be potential conflict with national policy if the
courts were to assume jurisdiction, they choose to deny jurisdiction in favor
of the NLRB.
When the NLRB has jurisdiction, a state or federal court may not
gain the same by attempting to invoke a tort concept embodied in state law,
such as interference with employment. 35 "If unfair labor practices are present,
the federal power is controlling and superseding. '36 However, the NLRB
may, in its discretion, cede jurisdiction to a state court, but only if that
37
state's laws are not inconsistent with the policies established by the NLRB.
It is left to the NLRB, however, to decide the controversy whenever it is "arguably subject to" Section 7 or 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, i.e.,
whenever the action is based upon an injury to the plaintiff's employment
relationship and not to his union relationship.
It seems clear that a court's jurisdiction over a union member's dispute
with his union has been very much limited by the exhaustion rule and by the
primary exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. In both instances, the courts'
jurisdiction has been either wrested from them, or voluntarily abdicated by
them, in order to further definite policies. In the case of exhaustion of remedies,
the purpose is to allow the unions themselves to settle intra-association dis32. It is most difficult to distinguish between an injury to employment and an injury to the union-member relationship with incidental damages to employment. Usually,
when a plaintiff asks for "back pay" damages, he is complaining of injury to his
employment.
33. See San Diego Bldg. Trade Council v. Garmon, supra note 25; Wax v. International Mailers Union, supra note 1.

34. Ibid.
35.
36.
37.

Baker v. Shopmen's Local 755, supra note 25.
Id. at 37, 168 A.2d at 343.
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
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putes without having to enter into court litigation. In the case of the
NLRB's pre-emptive jurisdiction, the purpose is to establish and apply a
uniform national policy in labor disputes. In both cases, the complaining party
is afforded access to a tribunal best able to consider his claim and render
redress. Abusive or arbitrary action on the part of either tribunal in the
administration of his action may be corrected by appeal to the courts.
H.
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